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The paper studies e¢ cient risk sharing under limited enforcement (or ￿lim-
ited commitment￿ ) constraints determined by the threat of punishment af-
ter misbehavior. As in Kocherlakota (1996), I assume that society chooses
from among those allocations implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium.
Rather than assume that punishments implement the least desirable contin-
uation equilibrium, I allow that punishments may be suboptimally speci￿ed
from the point of view of enforcement. I characterize (up to a technical con-
dition) the set of allocations that may be interpreted as e¢ cient subject to
enforcement by some punishment. The conditions rationalizing such e¢ ciency
are very weak; they are (i) resource exhaustion, (ii) satisfaction of individual
rationality constraints at each continuation, and (iii) ￿niteness of the value of
the allocation under the implicit decentralizing price system, the ￿high implied
interest rates￿condition of Alvarez and Jermann (2000). I show that e¢ cient
allocations may be decentralized and I state versions of the Welfare Theorems
for my environment.
￿Thanks are due to Dean Corbae, Russ Cooper, Dan Kovenock, Burhan Kuruscu, Beatrix Paal,
and seminar participants at Purdue University for helpful suggestions.
11 Introduction
What characteristics of the consumption processes of a cohort of agents over time
are consistent with e¢ cient risk sharing? Under the canonical speci￿cation of pref-
erences for consumption used in the macroeconomics literature, we can reject the
hypothesis whenever we can conclude that intertemporal marginal rates of substitu-
tion are not equated across agents at each point in time. Indeed, one is not hard
pressed to assemble data that contradict this implication of e¢ ciency.1
Recent research has focused on deriving the observable implications for e¢ ciency
and equilibrium in economies encumbered by enforcement (or ￿commitment￿ ) fric-
tions, but that are otherwise frictionless. In particular, these economies feature
perfect information and no transactions costs. Of critical importance in such work
is the speci￿cation of what agents may accomplish after a behavioral defection from
prescribed or contracted actions; that is, speci￿cation of punishments. In this re-
spect, Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Kocherlakota (1996) have set the paradigm
adopted by the rest of the literature. Following Abreu (1988), these authors each
suppose that agents are treated to the harshest punishment that is available subject
to the exogenously speci￿ed ￿autarkic￿capabilities of individuals.
A viewpoint motivating the present work is that e¢ cient mechanisms (e.g., mar-
kets) may organize the front line (i.e., the equilibrium path) of economic behavior,
but the response to a defection from the norm of prescribed behavior may be sub-
optimal from the point of view of enforcement. More precisely, rather than choosing
1Empirical investigations include Altug and Miller (1990), Mace (1991), Nelson (1994), Hayashi
et al (1996), Townsend (1994), Ham and Jacobs (2000). An interesting recent contribution that
tests (inter alia) for implications of e¢ ciency under limited commitment is Ligon et al. (2002).
2punishments optimally, I assume that defecting agents are punished by reversion to
some arbitrary subgame perfect continuation equilibrium.
The fundamental results of the paper constitute a characterization (up to a tech-
nical condition) of the set of consumption allocations can be rationalized as e¢ cient
with respect to some (generically suboptimal) punishments. The conditions a⁄ording
such an interpretation are (i) exhaustion of resources, (ii) satisfaction of individual
rationality conditions at each continuation, and (iii) ￿niteness of the value of the
allocation under the implicit decentralizing price system, the ￿high implied interest
rates￿ condition of Alvarez and Jermann (2000). These conditions are obviously
quite weak.
I also show how e¢ cient allocations can be decentralized in Arrow-Debreu markets
with ￿solvency constraints￿that set lower limits on agents￿claims positions as in
Alvarez and Jermann (2000). I extend their results to the present environment by
showing that, when the solvency constraints are set appropriately, equilibria of the
market economy coincide with the set of e¢ cient allocations. I also show that versions
of their Welfare Theorems hold for the present environment.
There are a number of studies of economies with enforcement frictions in which
defection is assumed to induce punishments other than autarkic consumption of
an endowment. Important contributions include Kehoe and Perri (2002, 2004),
Lustig (2004), Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005), Jeske (2006), and Krueger and
Fernandez-Villaverde (2001). I regard the present work as providing some bounds
on what behavior may be rationalized by modeling punishment institutions more
explicitly as these papers do.
3In the next section, I introduce the environment and the underlying game played
by its agents. The analysis and the principal results are contained in the third section.
The fourth section considers decentralization of e¢ cient alloctions in markets with
solvency constraints. The ￿nal section concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Environment
Time is discrete and in￿nite, and is indexed by t = 0;1;2;::: There are I < 1
agents in the economy indexed by i 2 I = f1;2;:::;Ig: Stochastic features of the
environment are summarized by a Markov process st taking values in a ￿nite set S:
The probability of a transition from s to s0 is denoted ￿ (s0js); and I assume (except
in several examples with deterministic transitions) that ￿ (s0js) > 0 for all s;s0 2 S:
I write st 2 St+1 for the history of process up to date t; the state history. If s￿ is a
feasible continuation of a state history st; e.g., s￿ ￿ (st;st+1;:::;s￿) and ￿ ￿ t; I will
write s￿ % st: I abuse the notation by writing ￿ (s￿jst) for the probability that state
history s￿ obtains conditional on reaching st: All stochastic processes in this paper
are assumed to be adapted to st: For any such process x; I will write xjst for the
continuation of x after state history st; that is, xjst is a stochastic process for initial
state st:
There is a single (consumption) good in the economy available at each date. The
aggregate endowment of the good is one unit. At each state history st at which the
state is st; agent i is endowed with a fraction ei (st) > 0 units of the good, where
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for all st 2 St+1:2
After any state history st; agent i evaluates the continuation allocation cjst ac-























where u : R+ ! R is di⁄erentiable, strictly concave, and strictly increasing. I also
assume that the Inada condition limc#0 u0 (c) = +1 holds. For future reference, I




















2.2 A Game of Multilateral Transfers
The game de￿ned here is a generalization of that studied by Kocherlakota (1996)
to the case of Markov shocks and an arbitrary number of agents.
2The space in which allocations lie may be interpreted to be l1; with the supremum norm in





















which will be interpreted as the set of vectors of non-negative transfers to the agents
in the game feasible from the realized endowment. A path is a function ￿ from state
histories st to pro￿les of actions such that ￿i (st) 2 Ai (st) for all i and st. Note that





























Also note that disposal of the good may be accomplished by agent i by setting ai
i > 0:
A game history for the period t is a pairing of a state history st and a history of
actions played up to date t ￿ 1: I denote an arbitrary game history of length t + 1
by ht = (st;at￿1); where at = (a0;:::;at) and at is the pro￿le of actions taken at t:
A (pure) strategy for player i is a function ￿i from game histories to actions
feasible for agent i for the current state; that is, ￿i (ht) 2 Ai (st): A strategy pro￿le ￿
is a collection of strategies, one for each player. Note that a strategy pro￿le ￿ induces
a path, say ￿(￿)(st) describing the sequence of actions followed when players abide
by ￿. It follows that a strategy induces an allocation, as well; and (abusing the





























6When agents play according to ￿; the continuation expected payo⁄ delivered to
i after game history ht can be written as Ui (￿ (￿ (ht;￿))jst); where ￿ (ht;￿) is the
strategy induced by ￿ for the subgame de￿ned by starting from game history ht
and st is the terminal state of ht: A subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) is a strategy



























where ~ ￿i is any alternative strategy for agent i: In this case, I will say that ￿ (￿) is
an SPE allocation. The one-deviation property of subgame perfect equilibria induces
the following characterization of the set of all SPE allocations; the proof of all of the
results in the paper are contained in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 There is an SPE that implements c on the equilibrium path (i.e., c is an
SPE allocation) if and only if c is feasible and Ui (cjst) ￿ Ui
aut (st) for all i,t; and
st % s0:
In what follows, I will write ￿ for the correspondence mapping from S to the set
of all SPEs starting from a given state.
2.3 Punishments and the Strategies of Interest
Let fi (st;￿) be a selection from ￿ for each i and st; that is, fi (st;s0) 2 ￿(s0) for
each s0: In this case, I will call f an (implementable) punishment. A pair (￿;f) of
a path and a punishment induce a strategy pro￿le, say ￿ (￿;f); as follows. First,
players are directed to choose their actions according to the path ￿ at each game
7history whenever no player has defected unilaterally from the assignment at a pre-
vious history. Multilateral defections are ignored; and upon the ￿rst perpetration of
a unilateral defection in the game, say by agent i at game history ht = (st;at￿1);
￿ (￿;f) directs that play in the continuation follow fi (st;s0).
Given f; let us say that c is supported by f if there exists a path ￿ such that
c = ￿ (￿) and ￿ (￿;f) is an SPE; in this case, write c 2 P (f):
Given a path ￿; the amount of consumption that i can obtain by defecting uni-

















It is an important property of the restrictions placed on play after a defection in the
environment is that the payo⁄ to an agent in the period after a defection depends
only on the identity of the defecting agent. This property and the one-deviation
property induce the following characterization of the set of equilibria of the form
￿ (￿;f).

































for all i; t; and st:
I stress an analogy between strategies of the form ￿ (￿;f) and those supported
by Abreu￿ s (1988) ￿optimal simple penal code￿ that imposes that any unilateral
8defection triggers a reversion to a particular equilibrium continuation that depends
only on the identity of the defector. Each concept has the property that punishments
are independent of the event that triggers them. The di⁄erence here is that the
reversion need not be the worst SPE continuation; rather, I allow that a lighter
punishment may be prescribed.
In much of the related literature, the properties of allocations that can be sup-
ported as SPE allocations by the threat of reversion to autarkic strategies is studied.
In what follows, I will address questions that are more general in the sense that I
do not take a stand on the form of the punishments, except to require that they
implement equilibrium continuations. First, I will examine the properties of alloca-
tions that are optimal with respect to a speci￿c welfare criterion subject to being
supported by a given punishment for defection. Second, I will ask when it can be
gleaned that a given allocation is e¢ cient in this sense for some punishment.
3 E¢ cient SPE Allocations
I begin this section by showing how to construct, for a given allocation, a path
that supports the allocation in way that minimizes the incentive for defection. A
useful result along the lines of the discussion at the close of the previous subsection
is that this may be done independently of the punishment itself.
Given an allocation c; I construct path to be denoted ^ ￿(c) as follows. De￿ne
￿
i (st) ￿ ei (st) ￿ ci (st); and de￿ne K(st) ￿
￿
k 2 Ij￿
k (st) > 0
￿




























Now for k 2 ￿ K(st); set ^ ￿
k
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k (st) if j 2 ￿ K(st):
It may be seen that ^ ￿(c) implements c with the minimal volume of transfers.
In particular, an agent that consumes less that his endowment at a given state
history makes transfers totalling ei (st)￿ci (st); and one that consumes more than his
endowment makes no transfers. It follows that gi (￿)(st) = maxfci (st);ei (st)g: The
utility of making the minimal volume of transfers is seen in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 An allocation c is supported by a punishment f if and only if ￿ (^ ￿(c);f)
is an SPE.
One interpretation of this result is that intra-temporal transfer arrangements
may be chosen to optimally apply the enforcement technology; and, as long as the
enforcement technology is described by reversion to a punishment chosen only as
a function of the identity of the defector, the implementing path may be chosen
independently of the punishments. In particular, a net clearing mechanism is best-
10suited in this regard.































































for all i; t; and st:






















for some ￿ in the I-dimensional unit simplex. From Corollary 1 and the monotonicity
of u(￿); it is equivalent to say that c is e¢ cient with respect to f if, for some ￿; c solves








for all t and st; and the inequality constraints (8) and (9). In what follows, I apply
the term e¢ cient generally to an allocation to mean that it is e¢ cient with respect
to some punishment.
In the risk-sharing literature, equation of agents￿intertermporal marginal rates
of substitution is the quintessential criterion for e¢ ciency. In economies with lim-
11ited enforcement, binding enforcement constraints may preclude that acheivement.
Alvarez and Jermann (2000) show that the following de￿nitions are useful for de-
scribing a phenomenon that is implied by e¢ ciency in such environments. For a





































I will say that c has high implied interest rates (Alvarez and Jermann (2000)) or























The following proposition establishes that having high implied interest rates is a
general property of e¢ cient consumption allocations, at least up to the restriction
that P (f) has an interior point.
Proposition 2 Suppose that ^ c is e¢ cient with respect to a given punishment f; and
suppose that P (f) has an interior point. Then ^ c 2 HIR:
The following example applies the concepts developed above and Proposition 2
to a speci￿c simple environment. It also shows that an e¢ cient allocation need not
exhibit high implied interest rates when P (f) does not have an interior point.
Example 1 Consider an two-agent economy in which agents￿endowments alternate
deterministically between eH = 2
3 and eL = 1 ￿ eH = 1
3; and let us suppose that




























for the agent with the low one.
In this example, I consider the punishment de￿ned at each continuation by the
autarkic strategies; call this punishment faut.3;4 Let us consider the support and
e¢ ciency of an alternating consumption plan characterized by a parameter ￿ c with
respect to this punishment, where the allocation is de￿ned such that the agent with
the high endowment consumes ￿ c; and the agent with the low endowment consumes
1 ￿ ￿ c: Call this allocation C (￿ c): Writing P￿ (faut) for the set of allocations that can






; C (￿ c) 2 P￿ (faut) if
￿(￿ c;￿) ￿
ln(￿ c) + ￿ ln(1 ￿ ￿ c)
1 ￿ ￿
2 ￿ VH (￿) ￿ 0: (16)
3The autarkic punishment is the one that maps to the unique strategy in which no transfers are
ever made by any agent after any history.
4In general, the ability to implement of a given (candidate) punishment as an equilibrium de-
pends on ￿: Autarky is the unique SPE that is implementable for all ￿ ￿ 0:
13(Note that (16) and the de￿nitions of VH (￿) and VL (￿) imply that
ln(1 ￿ ￿ c) + ￿ ln(￿ c)
1 ￿ ￿
2 ￿ VL (￿) > 0 (17)





:) Therefore, the alternating endowment C (￿ c) is e¢ cient with respect














ln(1 ￿ x) + ￿ ln(x)
1 ￿ ￿
2 (18)
subject to ￿(x;￿) ￿ 0 and x ￿ 2
3; that is, if C (￿ c) maximizes the equally-weighted
lifetime utility of the agents subject to the enforcement constraint on the agent with
the high endowment in each period (and feasibility is imposed). It can be shown
that ￿ c = 1
2 solves the program for ￿ ￿ 0:70951; and that ￿ c = 2
3 is the unique element
of the constraint set (and thus solves the problem) when ￿ ￿ 1
2:







curves correspond to higher values of ￿: Clearly, (16) holds for ￿ c = eH = 2
3 for all
values of ￿; that is, the autarkic allocation is in P￿ (faut). It can be veri￿ed that
this is the only allocation in P￿ (faut) for ￿ ￿ 1
2: For 1
2 < ￿ < 0:70951, some risk
sharing is possible, but no ￿rst-best allocation is suported.5 For ￿ = 0:6; for example,
an e¢ cient alternating allocation is given by ￿ c = 0:58206, the value such that the
inequality (16) holds with equality. Full risk sharing (for example, the symmetric
￿rst-best allocation ￿ c = 1
2) is supported for ￿ ￿ 0:70951:
5Following the Kocherlakota (1996), an allocation is ￿rst-best if it equates agents intertemporal
rates of marginal substitution at all state histories and exhausts resources. An alternating allocation
C (￿ c) is ￿rst-best if and only if ￿ c = 1
2; which is the symmetric ￿rst-best allocation. It can be shown




is an SPE allocation.











￿ q (C (￿ c)) =
￿￿ c
1 ￿ ￿ c
(19)
for all state histories in this example.6 For an allocation c￿ exhibiting ￿rst-best risk
sharing, we have ￿ q (c￿) = ￿ < 1; and the implied interest rates are always high. It
may be veri￿ed that, for ￿ = 0:6 and ￿ c = 0:58206; ￿ q (C (￿ c)) = 0:83561 < 1; so that
C (0:58206) 2 HIR in this case, as well.
On the other hand, notice that ￿ q (e) < 1 if and only if ￿ < 1
2; and autarky (e) is
e¢ cient if and only if ￿ ￿ 1
2: When ￿ ￿ 1
2 the constraint set of the e¢ ciency problem
is a singleton, and thus the hypotheses of Proposition 2 are not satis￿ed. Observing
that ￿ q (e) < 1 for ￿ < 1
2 and ￿ q (e) = 1 for ￿ = 1
2; it is clear that the conclusion of
Proposition 2 that the e¢ cient allocation exhibits high implied interest rates may




when the value is constant
over all state histories.
15apply (as for the cases with ￿ < 1
2) or may not apply (￿ = 1
2 case). ￿
The next proposition establishes a partial converse of the previous one. In the
spirit of Kocherlakota￿ s (1996) work, it addresses a question about which consump-
tion processes can be rationalized as e¢ cient. As in the previous proposition, the
high implied interest rates condition plays an important role.
Proposition 3 Given a feasible allocation c; suppose that (i)
P
i ci (st) = 1 for all
t and st; (ii) Ui (cjst) ￿ Ui
aut (st) for all i; t; and st; and (iii) c 2 HIR: Then there
exists a punishment f such that c is e¢ cient with respect to f:
Example 2 Consider the environment of the ￿rst example. For the case that ￿ = 3
4;






: By Proposition 2, this implies that
there is some punishment that supports the alternating allocation C (:55) as e¢ cient.
It is instructive to understand what such a punishment looks like.7
It can be seen that C (:55) is e¢ cient with respect to a punishment ^ f only if
an agent who defects in a period when his endowment is high receives continuation
7It is useful to note that, under the allocation C (:55); the agent with the high endowment gets
continuation utility
ln(:55) + :75ln(1 ￿ :55)
1 ￿ :752 = ￿2:7354; (20)
and the agent with the low endowment gets
ln(1 ￿ :55) + :75ln(:55)
1 ￿ :752 = ￿2:7726: (21)






in the period following the defection, where
ln(:55) + :75ln(1 ￿ :55)














= ￿3:1065: An equilibrium continuation that delivers
the required payo⁄to the agent with the low endowment is the one that delivers the
consumption (1 ￿ C (^ c)) = f1 ￿ ^ c;^ c;1 ￿ ^ c;:::g, where ^ c satis￿es
ln(1 ￿ ^ c) + :75ln(^ c)





that is ^ c = 0:64169: We can choose the punishments for the low-endowment agent so
that they will never be binding by setting ^ f to implement the symmetric allocation
following a defection by this agent. By defecting the agent with the low endow-
ment consumes 1 ￿ :55 in the current period, and consumes C (^ c) along the path
implemented by the punishment in the continuation; this results in the payo⁄ of
ln(1 ￿ :55) + (:75)
ln(^ c) + :75ln(1 ￿ ^ c)
1 ￿ :752 = ￿2:8787 (24)
for this agent.
To summarize, I have shown that the allocation in which the agent with the high
endowment at t = 0 gets the consumption
f:55;:45;:55;:45;:::g (25)
17is e¢ cient with respect to a punishment that speci￿es reversion to a continuation
equilibrium in which the agent with the high endowment gets consumption
f:64169;:35831;:64169;:35831;:::g: (26)
Note that the punishment is close to autarky, but is somewhat better for each agent.￿
4 Decentralization
The notion of market equilibrium introduced in this section is a generalization of
that studied by Alvarez and Jermann (2000).
A portfolio of contingent claims for agent i is a stochastic process bi with bi (st) 2
R: I write b for the pro￿le of agents￿portfolios.
An (Arrow) price system is a positive stochastic process p; where p(st;st+1) is
interpreted as the price after (exogenous) history st of a claim to a unit of the good
after history st+1:
A system of solvency constraints is a stochastic process d with d(st) 2 RI:
A competitive equilibrium with solvency constraints is a consumption allocation
c; a pro￿le of portfolios b; a price system p; and a system of solvency constraints d
such that

























































for each s0; and
















The following Proposition, which may be interpreted as a version of the First
Welfare Theorem for the present environment, is an obvious corollary of Proposition
3.
Proposition 4 Suppose that (c;b;p;d) is an equilibrium with solvency constraints;
that Ui (cjst) ￿ Ui
aut (st) for all i; t; st; and that c 2 HIR; then there are punishments
f such that c is e¢ cient with respect to f:
A version of the Second Welfare Theorem that applies is the following.
Proposition 5 Suppose that c is e¢ cient with respect to the punishments f, and
suppose that c 2 HIR; then there exist portfolios b; prices p; and solvency constraints
d such that (c;b;p;d) is an equilibrium with solvency constraints.
19Example 3 Let us consider again the environment of the previous examples with the
parameterization of Example 2, and let us see how the e¢ cient allocation considered
there may be decentralized.8 The price of claims to the good one period in the future
(in this deterministic environment) is constant across time at


















where bH (bL; respectively) is the quantity of claims held at the beginning of a
period by the agent who has the high (low) endowment in the period. Solving the
two budget constraints, we compute that bL = ￿bH = 0:06087: From the previous
example, we have seen that the support constraint must bind for the agent with the
high endowment; thus we set dH = bH = ￿0:06087: It was shown that the support
constraint was not binding for the agent with the low endowment, and it follows that
any value less than or equal to bL will serve as dL for the purpose of decentralization.
￿
Alvarez and Jermann (2000) show that the solvency constraints supporting an
8As above, I have found it convenient to drop the time subscripts and index agents by their
current endowments rather than ￿xed indices where no confusion is likely.














for all i; t; st: This is an intuitive benchmark for an economy in which agents are able
only to consume their own endowments in a period in which they defect. Then it can
be interpreted that an agent with wealth di (st) at st is indi⁄erent between abiding
the continuation of the competitive equilibrium and consuming his endowment in the
current and in each subsequent period. In the present environment, under an SPE
supported by arbitrary punishments, this interpretation is invalid, since defection
after st may earn an agent a payo⁄ larger than Ui
aut (st):
On the other hand, solvency constraints de￿ned by (30) are su¢ cient for the
decentralization of an allocation e¢ cient with respect to autarkic punishments. The
conditions (30) serve in this case, because (uniquely for the autarkic punishments)
(8) implies (9): Thus, it can be seen that the support constraints will never bind for
i in a period in which ci (st) > ei (st); so that the associated solvency constraints
will not be binding either. More generally, this need not be the case.
Alvarez and Jermann (2000) show that (30) implies that the solvency constraints
are non-positive, and thus they may be interpreted naturally as constraints only on
the amount of state-contingent ￿debt￿agents may take on. That this must be so
can be seen from the fact that autarkic consumption for all time after st satis￿es
the budget constraints after st for an agent with exactly zero wealth; this implies
that Ji
t (0;st) ￿ Ui
aut (st): Thus, if the solvency constraints are consistent with (30), it
must be that Ji
t (0;st) ￿ Ji
t (di (st);st); monotonicity of the function Ji
t (￿;st) implies
21the result. This property, too, may fail for more general punishments.
5 Conclusion
The paper studies e¢ cient multilateral risk sharing subject to enforcement (or
￿commitment￿ ) constraints determined by the threat of punishment after misbe-
havior. As in Kocherlakota (1996), I assume that the society chooses from among
those allocations implementable under subgame perfect equilibria. The novelty of the
present analysis is that, while most of the existing literature studies e¢ ciency when
the least desirable continuation equilibrium is assumed to obtain after a defection,
I allow that punishments may coordinate play on a continuation equilibrium that is
suboptimal from the point of view of enforcement. I take a relatively agnostic view
about what may constitute a punishment convention, imposing only the following
restriction on the enforcement technology: following Abreu (1988), the punishments
are de￿ned by the choice of a subgame perfect equilibrium continuation to be fol-
lowed after a defection, and the selection depends only on the exogenous history and
the identity of the defector.
The main results of the paper constitute a characterization (up to a technical
condition) of the set of allocations that may be interpreted as e¢ cient with re-
spect to some punishment. The observable restrictions imposed by e¢ ciency are
very weak; these are (i) exhaustion of resources, (ii) satisfaction of an individual
rationality constraint at each continuation, and (iii) ￿niteness of the value of the
aggregate endowment under an implicit decentralizing price system, the ￿high im-
22plied interest rates￿condition of Alvarez and Jermann (2000). Proposition 2 shows
that an allocation that is e¢ cient with respect to some punishments has properties
(i)-(iii) whenever the constraint set has an interior point. Proposition 3 shows that
an allocation that has these properties is e¢ cient with respect to some punishment
(constructed in the proof of the Proposition).
A heuristic motivation for studying such an environment is the notion that, while
front line institutions may facilitate the arrival of the economy at a locally e¢ cient
outcome, coordination of play o⁄ the equilibrium path may be accomplished less
e⁄ectively. For example, participation in markets is the focal device for coordinating
this ￿front line￿ , and much theory and evidence establishes their e¢ ciency proper-
ties; but there is less agreement about how the institutions that govern the treatment
of bankruptcy are determined. In economies with limited enforcement, these pun-
ishment institutions determine which paths may be sustained in equilibrium. Thus,
the determination of these features is obviously important.
There are a number of papers that study market economies with limited enforce-
ment in which the determination of the punishments is carefully modeled, and even
endogenous. Kehoe and Perri (2002, 2004) study international risk sharing in a
model with capital accumulation in which a country￿ s capital may not be seized, so
that ￿autarkic￿production and consumption depends on the quantity of capital the
country has accumulated. Lustig (2004) studies an economy in which ￿bankruptcy￿
results only in seizure of a collateral asset, with bankrupt agents resuming their
participation in the markets after their default. Krueger and FernÆndez-Villaverde
(2001) and Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005) study economies in which housing
23acts as collateral, and bankruptcy results only in the seizure of that asset.
A contribution of the present paper is to establish a benchmark bound on the
set of consumption allocations that may be implemented as outcomes of markets
facing the sorts of frictions modeled in these economies. The intuition I would
like to advance is that limited enforcement is a broadly applicable modeling tool,
and that a theory of economic behavior derives mostly from the speci￿cation of the
institutions that de￿ne the punishments. This point of view suggests that more
careful modeling of these institutions is the key to understanding the behaviorial
implications of limited commitment for consumption in the real world.
The analysis suggests a number of questions open for future research. First,
Proposition 1 suggests the value of e¢ ciently structured institutions for accomplish-
ing a desired set of transfers when enforcement is limited. It may be of interest to
investigate the degree to which real world ￿clearing mechanisms￿ful￿ll this theoret-
ical objective. Relatedly, it would be interesting to see how these optimal transfers
change as the restriction on the form of the punishments is relaxed; for example,
Under what circumstances and in what ways will the optimal transfer algorithm de-
pend on the punishments? Second, it might be interesting to study the implications
of applying a restriction like renegotiation-proofness to the set of admissible equi-
libria.9 Of related interest are criteria under which punishment continuations can
be sustained in markets, and the possibility that punishment continuations may be
interpreted to obtain on the equilibrium path.10 Finally, it may of focal interest to
study economies in which punishments are applied randomly after a deviation. Such
9See Evans and Maskin (1989), for example.
10Lustig (2004) o⁄ers an interpretation under which bankruptcy actually occurs in equilibrium.
24a model may o⁄er a simple parameterization of the ￿degree of enforcement￿available
in an economy useful in calibrations and empirical work.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Necessity is obvious from the de￿nition of an SPE, and the
fact that ￿i
j (ht) = 0 for all j and ht de￿nes a strategy that gives at least Ui
aut (st) to
i at each history ht:
To show su¢ ciency, I construct a ￿simple￿(Abreu (1988)) pure strategy pro￿le
￿ that implements c on its path. I then show that ￿ is an equilibrium. I will write
h(st) for the game history that obtains when players abide by the path for exogenous
history st; and I let ￿ H be the set of all other histories.11
I begin by describing play following a defection: let ￿ (ht) = 0 for all ht 2 ￿ H: That
such play describes an equilibrium for the subgame following from ht is obvious, since
all h￿ % ht are in ￿ H; and any unilateral defection can be seen to hurt the deviating
player.
Let play along the path of ￿ be as prescribed by the function ^ ￿(c) in Section 3
of the text; that is, set ￿ (h(st)) = ^ ￿(c)(st) for all st:
I have now described ￿ (ht) for all histories on and o⁄ the path. To see that ￿
11It would be more precise to construct the path of ￿ and the function h(￿) by recursions, and
then de￿ne ￿ for histories o⁄ the path. This could be done as follows. First let h(s0) = s0 and
















for each s0; and then de￿ning ￿ (h(st)): That such an algorithm is available for the strategy pro￿le
I describe is obvious.
25constitutes an SPE for histories on the path, note that a defection at any history ht





































Thus, the one-deviation property implies that there can be no pro￿table defection
from ￿; Q.E.D.

































for some i; t; and st:
Now if ￿i
j (st) > 0 for some j; then the agent can consume exactly gi (￿)(st) at
st by taking the action de￿ned by ai
j = 0 for all j: The inequality above shows that
this is a pro￿table defection when the continuation will be governed by fi (st;s0): If
￿i
j (st) = 0; on the other hand, i can deviate by setting ￿i
1 = " (for example). This































26Th inequality above shows that this defection is pro￿table for " > 0 small enough.
The existence of a pro￿table defection is a contradiction; thus, the (7) must hold
whenever ￿ (￿;f) is an SPE.
For the converse, suppose that (7) holds for all st: First note that these conditions
and the fact that gi (￿)(st) ￿ ei (st) for all st imply that Ui (￿ (￿)jst) ￿ Ui
aut (st)
for all st; thus (by Lemma 1) there is an SPE (continuation) that delivers payo⁄
Ui (￿ (￿)jst;s0) for each (st;s0): Since fi (st;s0) is a selection from the set of (con-
tinuation) equilibria feasible from state s0; it follows that ￿ (￿;f) describes an equi-
librium for each subgame o⁄ of the path ￿: Moreover, there can be no pro￿table
defection along the path ￿, since a defection at a history ht = (st;￿ (￿)(st￿1)) gets i
at most the payo⁄on the right-hand side of (7): Thus, ￿ (￿;f) is an SPE, Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1. The ￿if￿part is obvious from the de￿nition of P (f): For
the ￿only if￿part, suppose that c is supported by a punishment f; so that ￿ (￿;f)










































































27The result then follows from Lemma 2.

















Proof of Proposition 2. It can be seen that ^ c solves a programming problem of
the form described in the text for some ￿ in the I-dimensional unit simplex. Write
































































































































































t￿(st)￿ (st), and ￿
t￿i
k (st)￿ (st) for k 2 f1;2g are non-negative Lagrange















































1 (s￿) + ￿i
2 (s￿)] + ￿i
1 (st+1)
￿





1 (s￿) + ￿i
2 (s￿)] + ￿i
1 (st)
￿






u0 (^ cj (st+1))






































































summable sequence (i.e., an element of l1) by Theorem 1 on page 249 of Luenberger
(1968).12












t=0 are the l1 components of elements in the non-negative orthant of the norm-
dual of l1. This space can be interpreted to be l1 + fa; where fa is the space of ￿nitely additive
29Before giving the proof of Proposition 3, I present several auxiliary results useful
in the proof of the main one.
In what follows, I de￿ne ￿(s) as the set of payo⁄ vectors w 2 RI such that, for
some ￿ 2 ￿(s); wi = Ui (￿ (￿)js) for each i; that is, ￿(s) is the set of payo⁄vectors
available under equilibria starting from state s:
Lemma 3 ￿(s) is convex for each s:
Proof. The set of allocations that can be supported by strategies constructed as in
the proof of Lemma 1 is easily seen to be convex. The convexity of ￿(s) is then easy
to establish from the continuity and concavity of U (￿js) in allocations, and the fact
that the action set admits the possibility of free-disposal of the good.
Lemma 4 If c is a feasible allocation, and Ui (cjst) ￿ Ui
aut (st) for all st; then
u(ci (st)) is bounded.
Proof. Clearly, u(ci (st)) ￿ u(1); so Ui (cjst) ￿ u(1)=(1 ￿ ￿): Thus Ui (cjst) ￿
Ui











































measures. For the proof of the present proposition, it is su¢ cient to restrict attention to properties
exhibited by the l1 component of the multipliers.
Note that the regularity of the maximum required by Luenberger￿ s Theorem are guaranteed by
the existence of an interior point and the fact that the constraint set is convex.
30The result follows from the fact that S is ￿nite.
Proof of Proposition 3. First set fi (s0;s0) = ￿aut for each i.13 The value of fi
at other points will be set according to the following algorithm.




















































































13The punishment will be constructed so that the enforcement constraints do not bind at s0:


























Since Uj (cjst;s0) ￿ U
j
aut (s0) for all j; t, and st; there is an equilibrium continuation
that delivers payo⁄Ui (cjst;s0) to i for each s0; select fi (st;s0) to implement such an
equilibrium for each s0. Repeating this procedure for each i and st ￿ s0 completes
the de￿nition of f.
Now it is su¢ cient to show that c solves a programming problem of the form
described in the text. From the hypotheses and the construction of f; it follows
that (8) and (9) hold for each i; t; and st: Thus, c is in the constraint set of the
problem. The Lagrangian function for this problem has the form in (38): To show
that c solves such a programming problem it su¢ ces (by Theorem 2 on p. 221 of
Luenberger (1968)) to ￿nd ￿ and multipliers (￿;￿) such that (c;￿;￿) constitutes a
saddle point of L(c;￿;￿):14 I begin by de￿ning appropriate weights and multipliers.













for all i and j:
The multipliers ￿i
1 and ￿i
2 will be de￿ned recursively as follows. First, let ￿i
1 (s0) =
0: Now for t ￿ 0; suppose that ￿i
1 (st) and ￿i
2 (st￿1) have been de￿ned (interpreting
￿i
2 (s￿1) as the value 0). If ci (st+1) ￿ ei (st+1); then set ￿i
2 (st) = 0 and set ￿i
1 (st+1)
14Note that, for the purpose of the Theorem of Luenberger, the Lagrange multipliers are the
sequences whose elements are ￿
t￿(st)￿ (stjs0) and ￿
t￿i (st)￿ (stjs0): It will follow from condition
(iii) of the hypothesis of the Proposition that each of the sequences constructed below is summable,






1 (s￿) + ￿i
2 (s￿)] + ￿i
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1 (s￿) + ￿i











1 (st+1) ￿ 0; and that ￿i




























Second, if ci (st+1) > ei (st+1); then set ￿i
1 (st+1) = 0 and set ￿i
2 (st) so that (52) holds.
Notice that ￿i
2 (st) ￿ 0; and that ￿i




























































note that the expression on the RHS is independent of i by construction.
Now by construction, the multipliers (￿;￿) can be seen to minimize L(c;￿;￿) over
all non-negative alternatives. It remains to verify that c maximizes L(￿;￿;￿): From
15To see the second claim in this sentence, note the following. We￿ ve already seen that the weak








and (46) holds. In such cases, fi (st;￿) has been de￿ned by (50); so (53) cannot hold.
16The second claim in this sentence follows by logic similar to that in footnote 15 .






































































converge absolutely, since (taking the ￿rst sum, for example)

























































Thus (e.g., by Theorem 3.55 of Rudin (p.78)) terms in the expressions may be re-
arranged without changing the value of the sums. Now showing that c maximizes


























































































is non-negative for all allocations ~ c: Now using the de￿nition of ￿(st); and combining




























































By the concavity of u; this expression is non-negative, Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. The result follows immediately from Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 5. The result may be established eactly as in the Proof of
Proposition 4.1 of Alvarez and Jermann (2000).
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